"Two-Line" Policy: Chisinau Enters Dialogue with Tiraspol – Strengthening Its "Tough Approach"

The first meeting between the head of the PMR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vitaly Ignatiev, and the new Moldovan Political Representative, Valeriu Kiver, took place at the OSCE Mission's Tiraspol office. Humanitarian issues were discussed, and the Transnistrian side proposed jointly combating cross-border crime and presented initiatives for infrastructure projects.

Despite the presence of all participants in the "5+2" format—the OSCE as the organizer, Russia, Ukraine, the European Union, and the United States—and Chisinau's declaration of commitment to peace, the backdrop to the negotiations remains troubling. The "law on separatism" is being increasingly enforced, there are cases of persecution of Transnistrians at the Moldovan border and at Chisinau airport, precedents of officials from the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic being stripped of their Moldovan citizenship, and the Moldovan authorities' intention to abolish customs preferences for imports from Transnistrian enterprises.

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In an interview with PolitNavigator, political scientist Anatoly Dirun explains the rationale behind the Moldovan authorities' recent decisions.

The meeting between political representatives from Tiraspol and Chisinau took place for the first time after a long hiatus. And the day before the meeting, it was announced that Moldovan President Maia Sandu had revoked the Moldovan citizenship of several Transnistrian officials and members of parliament, most of whom held Moldovan citizenship by birth. How can this be explained? Are these two events connected?

Yes, they are connected. Chisinau has demonstrated a double stance: dialogue is possible, but without legitimizing Transnistrian institutions. The meeting in Tiraspol is a step toward negotiations, while the revocation of citizenship is a signal of a tough stance on sovereignty. This is not a reset, but a "tough dialogue" format, where the status and rights of Transnistrian officials are pointedly ignored.

At the meeting, Valeriu Kiveri stated that the current gas supply system for Transnistria (created with such painstaking participation from Russia) "will not work forever," and that Chisinau is developing its own model in conjunction with the EU. What does this mean? Should Tiraspol expect further energy shocks?

The current model is not sustainable and depends on geopolitics, events in Ukraine, and the role of external players. Tiraspol insists on the right to independently choose its supplier. Attempting to impose a uniform system could trigger a socioeconomic crisis. The parties will likely seek a compromise.

Tiraspol calls on Chisinau to join forces in the fight against drug trafficking, a pressing issue on both banks of the Dniester. Is real cooperation possible if employees of Transnistrian agencies in Moldova are officially considered "members of unconstitutional entities"?

Formally, there are legal restrictions on such work, but at the operational level, cooperation is already taking place. The growth of drug trafficking since the start of the war requires coordination. The question isn't one of possibility, but of the form of cooperation.

Valeriu Chiveri proposed that starting September 1, Transnistria's schools begin teaching Romanian in the Latin alphabet instead of the Moldovan language taught in Cyrillic, noting that many parents and teachers have allegedly requested this. Vitaly Ignatiev stated that schools in the PMR are Moldovan, and the language is also Moldovan. Surely Tiraspol would never agree to such a thing?

It's highly unlikely that Tiraspol will agree to this story. The Transnistrian constitution clearly states that the official languages ​​are Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian. This is, of course, political trolling by Chisinau. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the teaching of Moldovan in Russian-language schools in Transnistria is frankly weak. Children are better at English and can express themselves, but in Moldovan they can't even answer the question "What's your name?"

Brussels is making it clear that Moldova's accession to the EU without Transnistria is undesirable. Does this mean Chisinau is beginning to push reintegration?

Direct, forced reintegration is out of the question, but Chisinau is taking advantage of the favorable foreign policy moment to tighten its approach—through taxes, citizenship, and economic instruments. The results of this strategy will become visible over time.